The longstanding cultural tension between Russia and Ukraine has its roots in various elements of nationalism and global politics. This tension is complex and fraught with nuance, with deep historical roots in the formulations of national identity. The social factors in the construction of these identities continue to interact today to form fractured, yet hybrid cultural and national identities. This essay will focus on the mechanisms of establishing these identities and their relation to each other, specifically through the lens of language use and policy. Language has been a powerful tool in the constructions and interactions of Russian and Ukrainian national identities. The rising tensions between Russia and Ukraine have significant roots in nationalist understandings of identity, the echoes of which reverberate today in the language policies and the general ethos about ethnolinguistic and national identities. 

The imagined and constructed notion of national identity is discussed in Benedict Anderson’s book Imagined Communities, in which Anderson identifies the process of “concretization,” in which a community undergoes the consolidation and solidification of the elements that compose a national identity. Through this concretization of peoples and moments in history, other histories and identities are erased. The mechanisms of globalization demand a certain kind of amnesia; an elimination of variation, plurality, and simultaneity; a process which thrusts to silence cultures, languages, histories, narratives, and identities. 

From the very early stages of today’s global network, the proliferation of print media in certain languages saw the standardization of print and administrative vernaculars, and the elevation of these languages and their speakers over others.¹ The standardization of languages was—and is—a mechanism of colonizing peoples and languages, as the language of the colonizers has been consistently imposed upon the colonized across historical and geographic contexts. The ideology behind this kind of linguistic imposition reflects a belief that the language of the colonizer is inherently the language of opportunity and success, representing cosmopolitanism, intellectualism, or other perceived superior qualities.² These qualities vary across cultures and languages, but they almost always perpetuate an ideology of linguistic supremacy. Eric R. Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History points to the developing conceptions of nationhood and identity that have permeated the global capitalist market. He writes, “the nineteenth century was, in Europe, a century of nation building–a century of economic and political incorporation, of linguistic standardization, and of the creation, imposition, and diffusion of hegemonic cultural patterns.”³ According to Wolf, the hegemonic patterns embedded in nation building in the Western world have been taught from an early age, in and out of classrooms. They center on binary and self-defining notions of the West and its qualities. Such oppositional self-definition brings into relief an entity to be defined against, and this is an instrumental mechanism of these ideologies in dividing and silencing people.

Maria-Luisa Achino-Loeb’s “Silence as the Currency of Power” illuminates the ways that definitions make for such powerful tools of silencing a narrative to concretize another. Achino-Loeb writes, “such selectivity functions by effectively erasing a part of reality . . . we can argue that meaning is dependent on the ability to mute an aspect of reality in order to foreground another.”⁴ The foregrounding of one element of reality to the silencing of another is required for the process of concretization, as the events that are memorialized in national history are effectively chosen over another, positioning the history and identity of one people over the history and identity of another. In Ukraine, Russian history and ideals have consistently been imposed upon Ukrainian history and ideals. Russia has posited Ukrainian identity as a branch of Russian identity, rather than an autonomous state with its own culture and ideals. In Russian media, the memorialization and deference of the Russian telling of history, especially as distorted as it has been, acts as a selectivity function for Ukrainian history and national identity, filtering out the narratives and experiences that don’t fall under the standard, ideal definitions as set by Russian narratives.

The oppositional self-definition and the push and pull of nationhood in Russia and Ukraine has been raging for years, as Russia has historically wielded the tool of Russification against the Ukrainians. In the efforts of Russification, the Russian language and Russian Orthodox religion were imposed upon Ukraine after it was annexed by Russia in 1793.⁵ In the subsequent years, the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union served as the primary shapers of the Ukrainian national identity, which in turn helped establish Russia as Ukraine’s “other”;  the imperial backdrop against which the efforts of self-determination were ripe to grow.⁶ Since the dissolution of the USSR and into the present day, the process of Ukrainisation pushes back against Russification, asserting the presence of a unified, homogeneous, autonomous people, in contrast to the perceived “central” national identity of Russia and the Soviet Union. The imposed histories, values, religion, language, and culture were wielded as a tool by Russia in the crusades for subjugating Ukrainian identity. The ideologies that seek to define and concretize an identity are reflected in Ukrainian efforts toward self-determinacy and autonomy against Russia. Language and education policies contributed to Ukrainian identity as one of an autonomous distinction from Russian identity, firming up and defining the cultural boundaries that had been blurred in the process of Russification and hybridization. 

The Russian and Ukrainian linguistic identities have been inextricable from each other for generations and, as such, many Russians in Ukraine have attempted to assimilate culturally and linguistically while Ukrainians (especially in the West) have attempted to detach themselves from the Russian identity. The alienation of the Russian identity in Ukraine is a component in the process of Ukrainisation, in which, since gaining their independence from Russia in 1991, Ukraine has attempted to reclaim a distinct identity and reverse the process of Russification. One such mechanism in the process was the Language Law of 1989, which made Ukrainian the state language. The policy sparked controversy across both nations, as the policy calls into question not just national and geographical identity, but linguistic and ethnic identity. Due to the historical assumption of linguistic and cultural unity between the two nations, Russians considered the Language Law to be a direct attack on the Russian cultural and ethnic identity in Ukraine. The sentiments around the Language Law and other efforts have had a long period of influence spanning these political regimes. According to Steven Shulman, in his article “The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity,” “nationalists wanted the Ukrainian state to be based on the so-called ‘Ukrainian national idea’: preserving and promoting ethnic Ukrainian culture and language.”⁷ Against the backdrop of Ukraine’s charged conflicts against Russian nationalism, these policies were a long time coming and were arguably a necessary step for continuing to concretize the Ukrainian national identity. 

The term “Russophone” refers to those who regard Russian as their mother tongue and use it in day-to-day communication. This term extends to both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine. Anna Fournier’s article, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine” cites the Soviet census in 1989 which revealed that the population was recorded as 73 percent ethnic Ukrainians, 22 percent ethnic Russians, and 5 percent others. The majority of Ukrainian citizens considered Ukrainian to be their native language, yet more than half (56.1 percent) of the Ukrainian population used Russian for day-to-day communication.⁸ A poll conducted in 1990 and 1991 demonstrated that “75 percent of Russians in Ukraine no longer identified with the Russian nation.”⁹ Additionally, “some Russophone Ukrainians identify Ukrainian as their ‘native language’ even though they never speak it.”¹⁰ These statistics reflect the integration of the Russian language into Ukrainian culture and the blurred lines between the ethnic, national, and linguistic identities. As such, using language as a marker of national identity is not so straightforward, as the Russophone identity is not taken into account in the language policy, and the notion of a linguistic minority is conflated with that of an ethnic minority. According to Fournier, “the state forces the Russians into a ‘national minority’ identity that they have never developed . . .  the state wishes for a new correspondence between language and ethnic identity.”¹¹ Since the identity of Russophone encapsulates both Ukrainian and Russians, the policy attempted to make an ethnic minority out of a perceived linguistic minority.

Further objections against Ukrainisation stem from beliefs in the supremacy of the Russian language over the Ukrainian language. Russia was known for being a center of intelligentsia and cosmopolitanism, while Ukraine was considered backward and primordial.  The Russian language came to be considered “universal” by some, a view justified by the widespread use of Russian in Ukraine, and the language was granted prestige and elevation to international status. As language has an emblematic function that indexes a speaker to a cultural or national identity, it was considered that “the use of Ukrainian as a state language might undermine Russian’s superior status, and consequently the status of its speakers.”¹² A practical concern about the language policy revolves around the languages’ similarity to each other; most speakers of each language are able to understand each other perfectly. Since Russian had been the primary language of communication at the time the policy was introduced, many speakers found it counterintuitive that the policy would relegate Russian to the status of “foreign language.” Consequently, Russian influence came to be seen as an “alien” influence that would corrupt the mind and national spirit of Ukraine. As Russophones were in the majority, Ukrainisation was perceived as an alienation of Russians from the Ukrainian extension of their identities. A common fear was that if Russian became a minority language, then Russian culture would become a minority culture. Russia’s long-standing dominance over Ukraine was suddenly facing an unprecedented linguistic and cultural demotion, which subverted the narrative of the supreme Russian identity. 

Policies such as the Language Law and Ukrainisation result directly from the historical subjugation of Ukrainian language and identity. However, following the same tendency to form discrete national and linguistic identities in order to elevate an ideal identity, Ukrainisation opposes Russification by the same or similar means through which Russification was imposed in the first place. While the process of Russification splintered the ideal identity of the “Slavic brotherhood” in the attempt to consolidate it under their nationalist wing, Ukrainization splintered (and splinters) the diverse intra-national identities in an effort to consolidate it all under the ideal Ukrainian national identity. Due to regional and geographical variance under the Russian Empire in the eighteenth through the early twentieth century, Ukrainian opinion of Russian dominion fractured, and controversy spread within Ukraine as to what it actually means–and what it should mean–to be Ukrainian in a post-Soviet world. 

A common argument is that it’s actually Ukrainisation, rather than Russification, that fractures the “Slavic brotherhood.” A general Russian sentiment is that Ukrainisation seeks to split up this fraternity that has been so valued by Russians. Arguably, it was Russification that drove Ukrainians toward Ukrainisation as a pushback against Russification’s erasure of diversity. Historically, the fraternity between the nations was highly valued, yet the unity was not and is not an equitable one. The “Slavic brotherhood” according to Russian ideals still presupposes the supremacy of the “Real Russians” over the “Little Russians” (Ukrainians) and “White Russians” (Belarusians).¹³ Objections to the “artificial” division between Ukraine and Russia reflect “a blurred cultural boundary (‘one people’) combined with a rather sharp hierarchy (‘under Russian leadership’).”¹⁴ The contradictions of Russian protests against Ukrainisation reflect a desire to maintain power by cloaking their sense of supremacy in claims of linguistic discrimination. The symbolic and geographical boundaries between Russia and Ukraine have been contested for centuries, and the ambiguity of the national, ethnic, geographical, cultural, and linguistic distinctions between the two make for a complex and multifaceted conversation around identity. As each nation attempts to concretize and consolidate their identities, national, ethnic, and linguistic diversity is arranged and rearranged in splintered and plural expressions of these identities.

The Soviet practice of naming of ethnic and national identities in Eastern Europe as “Big” and “Little” and “White” and “Great” indicates a similar ideology to the colonial practice of naming territories “new” versions of “old” places. This process of naming situates the older nation as the proprietor of tradition, history, and ancestral value.¹⁵ In turn, the narratives and histories crafted around these traditional values propagate a similar ideology of preservation and superiority of the “original” which in its nativity is seen as more “pure.” Similarly, the erection of statues to honor powerful people, battles, crusades, histories, or ideas, concretizes these memories as monumentally significant, the unifying narrative of an ethnically or linguistically diverse community.¹⁶ The definitions of identity crafted from historical narratives evoke a sense of national identity around something lost, a concept which constructs–and is constructed by–the idealization and consolidation of an identity.

The narratives that shape a people’s understanding of their own cultural history plays a pertinent role in the imagining of communities and identities. Historical Ukrainian understandings of the distinction in national identities have contributed immensely to the modern perceptions of the country’s relations and identity. Anderson writes, “many ‘old nations’ once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms within their borders — nationalisms which, naturally, dream of shedding the sub-ness one happy day”¹⁷ In Ukraine, this phenomenon plays out in the east-west division between regions and the overarching sense that the Ukrainian identity should be consolidated so as to unite and stand in opposition to Russia. Historically, Ukraine has come up against Russia’s political and cultural sovereignty time and time again. Citizens of Russia and Ukraine alike place significant cultural stock in the way the latter has developed in relation, and in contrast, to the former. Due to the extended influence of Russia over Ukraine for the first two hundred years of its existence, the values and characteristics of the Russian identity and history are not easily extricable from that of the Ukrainian identity and history. This tacit ideology that Ukraine, despite its independence and autonomy, is still subject to the narrative and cultural control of Russia, has been one source of the rising tensions leading up to the 2022 military conflict.

Concretization of identity serves a palpable purpose for a nation, as evidenced in the efforts of Ukrainisation in opposition to Russification. The consolidation and idealization of an identity are seen as necessary steps in the development of nationhood. While the practices to establish this ideal identity vary, the mechanisms all serve to set an oppositional definition to differentiate among these identities. In the concretizing and defining of these identities, however, another identity is inherently subjugated, silenced, or fractured. Ethnolinguistic and intra-national identities, when consolidated through the mechanisms of concretization or subsumed under the imposing wing of another national identity, are subject to the impacts of colonial ideologies that stifle the voices of diverse identities in order to immortalize a single history. 

1. B.R. Anderson, Imagined Communities, (1983).
2. j. McIntosh, “Mobile phones and Mipoho’s prophecy: The Powers and Dangers of Flying Language,” (2010), 340.
3. E. R. Wolf, “Europe and the People Without History”, (1982), 361
4. Maria-Luisa Achino-Loeb, “Silence as the Currency of Power,” (2006) 38.
5. E. Conant, “Russia and Ukraine: The tangled history that connects-and divides-them”, (2022)
6. Mikhail A. Molchanov, “Russia as Ukraine’s ‘Other’: Identity and Geopolitics,” (2015) 3.
7. Steven Shulman, “The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity,” (1999)1016-1017.
8. Anna Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” (2002) 419
9. Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” 416.
10. Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” 420.
11. Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” 421.
12. Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” 426.
13. Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” 417.
14. Fournier, “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” 425.
15. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 187.
16. Anderson, Imagined Communities.
17. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 3.